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Investment E¤ects of Wealth Taxes under
Uncertainty and Irreversibility 1 Introduction
The tight …scal constraints in several European countries as well as the growing dissatisfaction with perceived distributional inequality (for example, OECD 2015) gave rise to a discussion on the (re-)introduction of wealth taxes. 1 To avoid misleading statements concerning possible distributional consequences of wealth taxes, preceding analyses of the economic and particularly investment e¤ects are necessary. As investments drive job creation, tax-induced changes in investment may signi…cantly a¤ect the income and wealth distribution. If wealth taxation a¤ects investment decisions in an unexpected way, forecasts of distributional e¤ects of wealth taxes are necessarily ‡awed. We investigate the investment timing e¤ects of individual or corporate wealth taxes under uncertainty and irreversibility because investment timing is an important indicator for investors'propensity to carry out risky projects. The goal of our paper is to …gure out whether wealth taxes have real e¤ects and under what conditions wealth taxes foster or hinder risky investments.
Focussing on tax rate e¤ects in the …rst place, we …nd that an increase in the wealth tax rate can either delay (hinder) or accelerate (foster) risky investments. In terms of risk taking this result implies that higher wealth tax rates can either stimulate or depress the propensity to invest in risky projects. A similar ambiguous result can be derived for increased wealth taxation of the default alternative (risk-free …nancial investment).
Furthermore, for su¢ ciently low tax values of a project due to a low initial tax value or high depreciation rates for wealth tax purposes, higher wealth tax rates surprisingly 1 The e¤ects of wealth taxes have been controversally discussed in previous years. See, e.g., Balogh (1964) , Stiglitz (1969) , Mieszkowski (1972) , Thurow (1972) , Bentick (1979) , Mills (1981) , Brennan and Nellor (1982) , Michalos (1988) , Bird (1991) , Burbridge (1991) , Davies (1991) , Mintz (1991) , and Kocherlakota (2005) . 1 can accelerate investment. Higher wealth taxation of …nancial investments in comparison to real investments can delay real investment if the wealth tax rate is su¢ ciently high.
We …nd that such apparently paradoxical wealth tax e¤ects -accelerated investment upon a wealth tax rate increase -are more likely for low interest rates and for high-risk investments. As a change in investments following an increase in wealth taxes will a¤ect pro…ts and job creation and may increase distributional inequality our results indicate that tax politicians who strive to reduce inequality need detailed information about the e¤ects of wealth taxation on di¤erent types of investment projects. Tax legislators should be aware that the e¤ects depend on the expected development of pre-tax pro…ts as well as the valuation of assets for income and wealth tax purposes.
In contrast to tax rate e¤ects we …nd that valuation e¤ects are unambiguous: higher initial or subsequent valuation of assets for wealth tax purposes always delays investment. A tax legislator whose intention is to encourage risk taking should de…ne a relatively small tax base. Moreover, it is ambiguous whether historical cost valuation or fair value accounting accelerate investment.
Our …ndings are relevant for individual investors as well as for the current tax policy discussion on whether or not to (re-)introduce a general wealth tax. For example, the IMF suggested the introduction of wealth taxes in developed countries in various recent studies (IMF 2013 , IMF 2014 . Furthermore, Atkinson (1971) , Piketty, and Saez (2003) , Saez and Veall (2005) , Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) and more recently Piketty (2014) received a lot of attention with descriptives of the development of the capital/income ratio over time in many countries. As a consequence, he raises the claim for wealth taxes.
Although this work has been heavily criticized, the call for an introduction of e¤ective redistributive instruments fed the public concerns on inequality signi…cantly and led to an intensi…ed political debate on reintroducing wealth taxes and increasing inheritance taxation. 2 2 See, for example, Cnossen and Bovenberg (2001) for the Netherlands, Edson (2012) for Norway, 2 Most countries levy taxes on speci…c property, such as real estate, vehicles and other assets. However, many countries have since the 1990s abolished a general wealth taxation (see, for example, OECD 2014). 3 The following table summarizes information on wealth tax rates and wealth tax abolishment, respectively: Table 1 : Wealth taxation and its abolition in selected countries Sources: KPMG (2012a KPMG ( , 2012b , BMF (2013) , EY (2014a EY ( , 2014b , IBFD (2015) Notes: Wealth taxes on selected property, like taxes on vehicles, real estate, etc. are not included in this table
The proponents of wealth taxes often link their arguments to the budgetary consequences of the recent …nancial and …scal crisis and argue that particularly wealthy people should contribute their fair share to society. Opponents of wealth taxation suspect that wealth taxation could depress investment, hinder or prevent risk-taking and innovations and lead to capital ‡ight. This could induce even lower total tax revenues than in an environment without wealth taxation. Glennerster (2012) for U.K., Ristea and Tranda…r (2010) for Romania, Keuschnigg et al. (2013) for Austria, Sureth and Maiterth (2008) , Schratzenstaller (2011) , Maiterth and Houben (2012) , Spengel, Evers, and Evers (2013) , Bach, Beznoska, and Steiner (2014) , Hoppe, Maiterth, and Sureth (2015) for Germany. Furthermore, Auerbach and Hassett (2015) , who reviewed Piketty's work do not see a wealth tax as an appropriate policy instrument.
Against the background of this controversial discussion, it is particularly important to disentangle the e¤ects of a wealth tax on investment under uncertainty. In this respect the economic e¤ects crucially depend on the impact of wealth taxes on investment timing, and not only on the decision on whether or not to invest. If risky projects are considered innovative they can signi…cantly contribute to economic growth. Thus, postponement of these projects may be especially harmful for economic development and subsequently for the distribution of income and wealth.
Whereas the e¤ects of pro…t (or income) taxation under uncertainty are well known since the late 1990s (for example , Niemann 1999a , 1999b , Sureth 1999 , Pennings 2000 , Agliardi 2001 , Panteghini 2001 , 2004 , Sureth 2002 , Niemann and Sureth 2004 , Alvarez and Koskela 2008 , Schneider and Sureth 2010 , Gries, Prior, and Sureth 2012 , Niemann and Sureth 2013 , the e¤ects of wealth taxes have not yet been investigated under conditions of uncertainty and irreversibility. This is surprising against the background of the recent …ndings on the economic implications of pro…t taxation on investments in risky projects. Prior literature identi…ed parameter-dependent, partially subsidizing as well as discriminating e¤ects of pro…t taxation on risky investments that are due to uncertainty (for example, Alvarez and Koskela 2008 , Schneider and Sureth 2010 , Gries et al. 2012 , Niemann and Sureth 2013 . These …ndings indicate that tax reforms that are intended to foster investment such as tax rate cuts, may have dysfunctional e¤ects on investment activities, in particular in high-risk industries. Although wealth taxes are often considered to further hinder risky investment, hardly any corresponding research on wealth taxation under uncertainty has been conducted. If the wealth tax is precisely levied on the market value as de…ned by the present value of future cash ‡ows from the underlying capital, the investment e¤ects generated by the wealth tax will in present value terms not di¤er from those of a pro…t tax. However, for many types of capital assets market values cannot be observed due to a lack of su¢ ciently liquid markets. Furthermore, the tax legislator for example might intentionally de…ne asset values that are only weakly related to the market 4 value to simplify the tax assessment. Consequently, the e¤ects of wealth taxes on risky investments are likely to be di¤erent from those of pro…t taxes. Therefore, a detailed analysis of wealth taxes and their e¤ects on risky investment decisions is important.
Several studies, such as Vlassenko (2001), Arnott (2005) , Arnott and Petrova (2006) , investigate various property tax systems conceptually and theoretically with respect to e¢ ciency and fairness. Property taxes are similar to wealth taxes as they can be regarded as taxes on speci…c assets. These studies identify distortions in e¢ ciency of di¤erent magnitude depending on the property tax design. Dye, McGuire, and Merriman (2001) study empirically the impact of property taxes on business activities and …nd that high property tax rates lead to signi…cantly slower growth rates. Craft and Schmidt (2005) …nd evidence for signi…cant decreases in vehicular capital after changes in vehicle property taxes. In line with that result Allee, Lynch, Petroni, and Schroeder (2015) …nd signi…cant sensitivities of petroleum re…neries in their crude oil inventories when they experience a personal property tax. Hansson (2008) analyzes the abolishment or suspension of general wealth taxation in Austria in 1994 , in Denmark in 1997 , in Germany in 1997 In deterministic models the impact of wealth taxes on investment behavior was extensively analyzed in the German analytical tax literature in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, by Wagner/Dirrigl (1980) , Siegel (1982) , Mellwig (1985) , or Georgi (1994) . They …nd that wealth taxation has an ambiguous impact on investment decisions, depending on the valuation of assets for wealth tax purposes.
To the best of our knowledge only van Wijnbergen and Estache (1999) investigate the impact of a special case of wealth taxes under uncertainty explicitly. They examine the 5 impact of a minimum asset tax, which is similar to a wealth tax, on high risk …rms using an option pricing approach and a Monte Carlo simulation with Brazilian data. They consider uncertain returns and …nd increased sectorial distortions and that high risk …rms do not seem to be hit harder by the underlying tax. Under speci…c conditions the introduction of the minimum asset tax may even lower the marginal e¤ective tax rates. Their results are in line with the wealth tax paradox that has been elaborated under certainty in Sureth and Maiterth (2008) .
Until now, no study has been conducted that addresses the investment and timing e¤ects of a classical wealth tax in a stochastic environment with random cash ‡ows. Particularly, as studies on the recently proposed tax on corporate and individual wealth in Germany indicate severe distortions (Spengel, Evers, and Evers 2013, Hoppe, Maiterth, and Sureth 2015) , the investment e¤ects have to be analyzed prior to discussing potential distributional consequences. For example, Hoppe et al. (2015) …nd in their company data-based simulation that the tax burden on pro…ts is doubled on average and in some cases even quadrupled by the proposed wealth tax. Furthermore, on average 15% of corporations' equity is lost after six years of wealth taxation implying high risks for …rms and jobs.
Against the background of these …ndings, and the partially puzzling results from prior research on wealth taxes, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of the e¤ects of wealth taxes on risky investments. In this respect the economic e¤ects crucially depend on the impact of taxes on investment timing, and not only on the decision on whether or not to invest. If risky projects are considered innovative they can signi…cantly contribute to economic growth. Thus, postponement of these projects may be especially harmful for economic development (Bar-Ilan and Strange 1996, Riddick and Whited 2009, Bachmann, Caballero, and Engel 2013). 4 To …ll the research gap we analyze the impact of wealth taxes on investment timing. We employ a real options model of the Dixit/Pindyck type to model investment behavior under conditions of uncertainty and irreversibility. In addition to a pro…t tax, a wealth tax is introduced. The wealth tax parameters under consideration include the wealth tax rate, the initial and subsequent valuation of assets for wealth tax purposes, the valuation method (historical cost versus fair value accounting) and the wealth tax treatment of the default alternative. More speci…cally, our model paves the way for future empirical studies of investment timing under wealth taxation.
This paper is organized as follows. We present our investment model in section 2. The impact of varying wealth tax parameters is analyzed in section 3. Neutrality aspects of wealth taxation are discussed in section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
Model setup
Our model of investment is based on the Dixit/Pindyck framework that is frequently used for the analysis of tax e¤ects under uncertainty and irreversibility. We assume that a riskneutral investor has the option to invest in an in…nitely-lived real investment project that yields stochastic cash ‡ows. This option is a proprietary business opportunity, which is due to some earlier business activities by the investor. Typically, the option does not represent an asset that can be recognized or traded. Rather, the option value is a technical construct that is needed for the optimal decision. Since the investor holds a monopoly on the option, we can exclude competition e¤ects. 5 For reasons of mathematical simplicity the option to invest is considered perpetual. 6 The investment project can be subject to wealth taxation. The investor uses individual calculus for valuation of both the project and the option to invest. They can either immediately invest into the real investment project or wait until the observable realizations of the cash ‡ows prove to be 5 For strategic option exercise games see, e.g., Grenadier (1996) , Grenadier (2002) , and Weeds (2002) . Grenadier (2002) shows that the impact of competition substantially diminishes the value of the option and induces investment decisions similar to the net present value rule.
6 Otherwise, the model would involve partial di¤erential equations that cannot be solved analytically. 7 su¢ ciently attractive. Thus, the investment problem is two-dimensional as it captures both the decision on whether and when to invest. We do not assume that the so-called spanning property holds, implying that liquid markets for the assets do not necessarily exist. 7 As long as the option to invest is not exercised available funds yield the riskfree capital market rate. If the option to invest is exercised, the investor gives up all ‡exibility and pays the deterministic acquisition cost for the project. 8 We assume that the project is entirely equity-…nanced to separate the tax e¤ects from investment and …nancing decisions.
It is the aim of this paper to analyze the combined e¤ects of pro…t and wealth taxation on investment timing. This research indicates that timing is an important issue in risk-taking decisions and can be interpreted as a measure of an investor's propensity to carry out risky projects. For example, even high-performing …rms are continuously challenged by new competitors and new products and services in the market. Thus, …rms have to balance out exploitation of their current market share and exploration to generate new innovative products, services and business models. No matter how successful a …rm exploits its current portfolio, investments in innovation have to be carried out at some time. As a consequence, the decision on when to shift limited funds from the exploitation strategy to the exploration strategy is an important timing decision. More or less all industries are characterized by this trade-o¤. Given that real-world investment decisions are typically now-or-later rather than now-or-never decisions, a real option framework is appropriate for analyzing tax e¤ects on investment. Against this background, the tax treatment of the investment project, the option to invest, and the default alternative (wait and see and park funds in a risk-free …nancial capital market asset) have all to be properly de…ned.
We consider only one level of taxation and thus abstract from the interaction of corporate 7 As a consequence, a hedge portfolio that is crucial in option pricing theory cannot be built. 8 Our assumption of deterministic and constant acquisition cost is due to mathematical simplicity. However, it would be possible to model cash ‡ows and acquisition costs as correlated stochastic processes, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , pp. 207-210. To focus on wealth tax e¤ects we leave this possible extension aside. 8 and shareholder level taxation. This assumption means that the investor is either a sole proprietor or partner in a partnership (pass-through entity) or a corporation that neglects shareholder taxation in corporate decision making. We do not discuss delegated investment decisions or principal-agent settings. 9 As long as the investor waits and does not (yet) invest, they earn the nominal risk-free pre-tax interest rate r. Interest earned is subject to the tax rate r . In accordance with tax law in several countries the tax rate on …nancial income r 2 [0; 1[ and the general income tax rate 2 [0; 1[ can di¤er. 10 Financial assets like bank accounts or bonds that yield interest income can be (and typically are) subject to wealth taxation at the ‡at rate ! 2 [0; 1[. The variable 2 [0; 1] denotes the fraction of these …nancial assets that is subject to wealth taxation.
As a result, the discount rate after taxes r is de…ned as 11
We will relax this assumption later to study how discount rates that are una¤ected by taxation, for example, in case of a tax-exempt default investment, a¤ect our …nding. Now, we assume that the after-tax discount rate is decreasing in r . Furthermore, it is always strictly positive. Otherwise, present values could reach economically meaningless in…nite values. 12
As wealthy investors who tend to have a high savings rate, are likely to invest rather than to consume liquid funds these assumptions about the default alternative are straight-forward. Moreover, under some standard capital market assumptions, investment and consumption decisions are separable. 13 In this case, the investor's time preference rate would coincide with the capital market rate and it would not be necessary to take consumption explicitly into account.
If however, the capital market properties did not permit this separation, the investor had to decide between investment and consumption. This situation could be modelled by an individual time preference rate that would be used for discounting instead of the risk-free interest rate r. As an exogenous parameter that re ‡ects the investor's individual preferences, would be una¤ected by taxes: @ =@ r = @ =@ ! = @ =@ = 0. The resulting wealth tax e¤ects therefore would be identical to the case with a constant risk-free interest rate that is una¤ected by (wealth) taxes: = @r =@ ! = 0. Consequently, this special case not only corresponds to a wealth tax-exempt default alternative, but also re ‡ects an explicit comparison of investment and consumption. To consider these important special cases, the parameter setting = 0 is constantly addressed in the subsequent analysis.
If the investor decides to exercise the option to invest and to acquire the investment project, they lose any further timing ‡exibility and are bound to the project until in…nity. However, the model does not include an obligation to invest in …nite time. If the project conditions are not su¢ ciently favorable the investor could theoretically postpone it until in…nity. We normalize the acquisition cost to unity (I 0 = 1). Once the project is in place its only bene…ts consist of the future operating cash ‡ows . Thus, the pre-tax value of the investment project is simply its expected present value.
In the following we develop our model stepwise, beginning with the pre-tax case (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 138-140, Gries et al. 2012, p. 522) . First, we abstract from uncertainty and growth. Then, we integrate growth, taxes and uncertainty. Under certainty and 13 See Fisher (1930, pp. 129-141) and Hirshleifer (1958) .
constant pre-tax cash ‡ows (t) = the option value is equal to zero and the pre-tax present value V of the project at time t = 0 computed with the pre-tax interest rate r is
which is independent of t. The optimal time to invest is given by the critical thresholds
Whenever > r the investment should be carried out immediately. Otherwise, investment
should never be carried out. If the pre-tax cash ‡ows (t) grow deterministically at the constant rate , with < r, we obtain (t) = (0) e t and the present value of the project is
so that the critical threshold of the initial cash ‡ow is given by
Introducing timing ‡exibility, the project value can be written as
Although this is a present value under certainty the positive growth parameter implies that the opportunity to invest at some future time s has a positive economic value that can be interpreted as an option value F (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 138-139) 
Maximizing F with respect to s yields the optimal investment time dF ds = (0) e (r )s + r e rs = 0 (8)
Now, immediate investment (s = 0) would be optimal for
In the case of immediate investment with the critical threshold (0) = r, the project value is
implying a strictly positive NPV of the project. Substituting (9) in (7) yields the value of the option to invest
The after-tax case can be derived similarly. The operating cash ‡ows are subject to income taxation. Operating cash ‡ows as well as interest rates are given in nominal terms, which means that they are not adjusted for in ‡ation. Depreciation d (t) can be deducted from the tax base. Since depreciation deductions are generally not proportional to pre-tax cash ‡ows, after-tax cash ‡ows do not grow at a constant rate even if pre-tax cash ‡ows do. Therefore, the resulting formulae are more complicated than those shown for the pretax case. For analytical simplicity we assume that depreciation deductions for income tax purposes are based on the acquisition cost of the project and decrease exponentially at the rate . 15 Thus, depending on the time structure of the project's cash ‡ow depreciation allowances may deviate from a neutral scheme of an economic depreciation. For an initial outlay normalized to unity (I 0 = 1) the depreciation deduction for income tax purposes at time t is
Assuming a full and complete loss-o¤set, the cash ‡ow after income taxes at time t amounts to
The wealth tax has to be subtracted as second tax term from this (preliminary) cash ‡ow.
If the wealth tax base at time t is given by W (t), total cash ‡ow after taxes is
The investor wants to determine the optimal time to invest and thus maximizes their current wealth max fV 1; F g :
This implies that the investor exercises the option to invest if the expected after-tax net present value of the real investment project reaches the value of the option F .
We will now proceed with the after-tax case under growth and uncertainty. Assuming stochastic cash ‡ows (t) and a risk neutral investor the after-tax value of the project in place V at time t = 0 is de…ned as the expected net present value
For further results the cash ‡ow process has to be de…ned. In accordance with prior literature (for example, McDonald and Siegel 1985 , Dixit and Pindyck 1994 , Niemann 1999b , Sureth 2002 , Niemann and Sureth 2004 we assume that the pre-tax cash ‡ow follows a geometric Brownian motion
with < r as the expected growth rate of cash ‡ows, as the volatility rate, and dz as increment of a standard Wiener process. Consequently, the expected pre-tax cash ‡ow at time t after investment is
which permits to write the project value as
Thus, the project value is de…ned as the sum of the present values of cash ‡ows after income taxes and tax savings due to depreciation deductions, less the present value of wealth tax payments.
With regard to the wealth tax base we have to distinguish two general concepts: fair value accounting and historical cost accounting. 16 Under historical cost accounting for tax purposes the initial wealth tax base W (0) equals some prede…ned constant:
The acquisition cost W HC = I 0 = 1 is the most important special case for the initial value.
However, it is also possible -and current tax practice for assets in some jurisdictionsthat the initial value of an asset for wealth tax purposes does not relate to acquisition cost or market price. 17
Subsequent valuation under historical cost accounting is a function of the initial value W . Similar to the valuation for income tax purposes we assume that the value for wealth tax purposes is written o¤ exponentially at the rate ! : W HC (t) = W HC e ! t . 18 The depreciation parameter ! is not necessarily positive, so that increasing or constant values are also possible. To avoid in…nite present values we only require that ! > r holds.
Under these assumptions the total project value simpli…es to
Under fair value accounting the initial wealth tax base should refer to the present value of the project at time t = 0. Since market values do not necessarily exist for each asset, it 16 Whenever we use the terms "fair value accounting" or "historical cost accounting", we refer to accounting for tax purposes rather than …nancial accounting. Financial accounting is not considered in this paper. Prior literature on property taxation indicates that the valuation method is crucial for the investment e¤ects of non-pro…t taxes. See, e.g., Bentick (1979) , Arnott (2005) , Arnott and Petrova (2006) . 17 The real estate tax (Grundsteuer) in Austria and in Germany can serve as an example for a rather arbitrary valuation, because the assessed tax value (Einheitswert) is neither based on acquisition cost nor on market value. The Austrian Constitutional Court even decreed the abolishment of the Austrian estate tax due to the (extremely) unequal valuation of real estate compared to other assets. See Verfassungsgerichtshof Österreich (2007) . 18 Again, any other depreciation schedule can be replicated by exponential depreciation in present value terms. Hence, the assumption of exponential depreciation does not restrict generality.
is common practice for the …scal authorities to use multiplier methods based on current cash ‡ows or even past cash ‡ows from annual …nancial statements to approximate market values (for example, Müller and Sureth 2011, Müller 2014) . 19 We assume that the …scal authorities use a multiplier f ( ) = 1= > 0 for wealth tax purposes to compute the project's initial value
This assumption implies that the growth and discount rates of the investor and the tax authorities do not necessarily coincide, T (r ). Like under historical cost accounting the subsequent value for wealth tax purposes is written o¤ exponentially at the rate ! :
Again, ! can be positive, zero, or negative as long as the condition ! > r holds. Consequently, the project value under fair value accounting is given by
In contrast to historical cost accounting, the current value of the cash ‡ow 0 a¤ects the present value of expected wealth tax payments in the third summand. 20
Given the value of the investment project we can determine the value of the option to invest. Since the investor can only decide between waiting or exercising the option, the decision variable is binary, and it is easily possible to determine the optimal investment behavior. We will start with the waiting region in which the option is kept alive. The optimal transition to the exercise region will be modeled by boundary conditions. Under the given set of assumptions with a perpetual option to wait and stochastic cash ‡ows that grow at the expected rate , the originally two-dimensional investment problem of whether and when to invest collapses to a pure timing problem. Consequently, there exists an optimal one-dimensional threshold for transition. To solve this problem we use dynamic programming to determine the option value. 21
The option to invest itself does not generate any cash ‡ows and thus no income tax base.
In principle, an option could be relevant for income tax as well as wealth tax purposes. For example, the increase or decrease of the option value could be taxable or tax-deductible under a given income tax scheme, respectively. 22 Alternatively, the option value could be subject to wealth taxation. However, tax systems in the real world do not recognize mere business opportunities as taxable assets. Therefore, we neglect tax consequences of the option to invest that might be relevant in ideal tax systems. Thus, the option's after-tax cash ‡ow equals zero in the case considered here.
As long as the option is kept alive, its only bene…t is the expected increase in value. The resulting equilibrium condition implies that the owner of the option expects an instantaneous return that equals the after-tax risk-free rate:
Application of Itô's lemma to the stochastic di¤erential dF and further transformation yields the ordinary di¤erential equation 23
with the solution
where A > 0 is a constant to be determined. From A; > 0 it is obvious that F (0) = 0
holds. This condition implies that an option on a valueless underlying is itself valueless. 24 21 For a comparison of dynamic programming and contingent claims analysis and the resulting tax e¤ects see Sureth (2004, 2005) . 22 Acquired real options like exploration rights, e.g., are depreciable under most tax regimes. Depreciation deductions on the option to invest are necessary in some neutral tax systems. See Niemann (1999b, pp. 57, 61) . 23 Since the option to invest is perpetual, the time derivative vanishes here. 24 Deriving the social value of the option would require extensive information that is beyond the scope of this model, such as social preferences or a social discount rate. Thus, we focus on the individual perspective. Musumeci and Sansing (2014) refer to the social value as an aggregate of project value and the present value of pro…t taxes collected by the government.
To derive the solution of the investment problem -the critical investment threshold at which it is optimal to exercise the option immediately -two free boundary conditions are needed (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p. 141) . The value matching condition requires that the project's bene…ts, as de…ned by its expected present value, must equal its costs, given by acquisition costs and abandoned option value, at the point of transition.
The smooth pasting condition requires the identity of marginal bene…ts and marginal costs at the critical threshold.
Since the project value depends on whether historical cost accounting or fair value accounting is used for wealth tax purposes, we have to compute two di¤erent critical thresholds from the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions.
The critical threshold for historical cost valuation is given by 25 Under fair value accounting for wealth tax purposes with initial value W F V = 0 = the critical threshold is di¤erent from (29), because the critical value 0 appears twice in the project value (23).
Since the critical investment thresholds (29) and (31) are …nite, they are reached within …nite time in expected value terms, given the assumption of a geometric Brownian motion.
From a tax politician's perspective it might be relevant whether this expected time is within the current legislation cycle.
To isolate the uncertainty e¤ect, we can derive the pre-tax investment threshold under uncertainty as a special case from (29) Obviously, the uncertainty e¤ect is re ‡ected in the fraction = ( 1) > 1. This implies that the expected NPV of the project is strictly positive at the time of exercise:
Under certainty ( 2 = 0), however, we have
implying a critical investment threshold 0 = r , which is equivalent to the deterministic case without timing ‡exibility, eq. (5).
Investment timing e¤ects of wealth taxation
The impact of wealth taxation on investment timing can be determined by computing the partial derivatives of the critical investment threshold HC 0 = F V 0 with respect to the di¤erent wealth tax parameters. These parameters are:
initial tax value of the project W HC for historical cost accounting, multiplier 1= for the initial tax value under fair value accounting, valuation method (historical cost versus fair value accounting), depreciation rate for wealth tax purposes ! , taxable fraction of …nancial assets (wealth taxation of the default alternative), 28 wealth tax rate ! .
Proposition 1 Increasing the initial tax value of the project W HC under historical cost accounting unambiguously increases the critical investment threshold. 29
Proof. @ HC 0 @W HC = 1
Proposition 2 Increasing the multiplier f ( ) = 1= under fair value accounting unambiguously increases the critical investment threshold.
28 E.g., in case of a property tax on real estate or a vehicle property tax we assume = 0. Usually, a general wealth tax implies = 1.
29 This partial derivative only makes sense under historical cost accounting. Under fair value accounting, the initial tax value W F V is a function of the cash ‡ow 0 .
Proof.
The economic reasoning for both results is as follows. The higher the initial tax value of the project, the higher the present value of wealth tax payments, whereas both the default alternative and the value of the option to invest remain unchanged. Consequently, higher initial tax values lead to lower expected after-tax returns from the risky investment, require higher future cash ‡ows and thus increase investment thresholds. As a result, investment is delayed. Identical results hold under certainty ( 2 = 0), because varying 2 does not alter the algebraic sign of = ( 1).
We can observe a corresponding result if we vary the subsequent valuation of the project, which we model using the depreciation rate for wealth tax purposes ! .
Proposition 3 Increasing the depreciation rate for wealth tax purposes ! under historical cost accounting and fair value accounting unambiguously reduces the critical investment threshold.
Higher depreciation deductions for wealth tax purposes reduce the present value of wealth tax payments of the project. Again, both the default alternative and the value of the option to invest remain unchanged. As a consequence, investment is accelerated, which is also true under certainty.
In contrast to the previous results, the choice of the valuation method by the tax legislator induces ambiguous e¤ects on investment timing. Whether historical cost valuation or fair value accounting are more likely to accelerate or delay investments depends on the initial value W HC and the multiplier 1= .
Proposition 4 The critical thresholds under historical cost valuation or fair value accounting are identical only if the following relation of W HC and holds: 30
For W HC = W g HC the investor is indi¤erent between both valuation methods. For W HC > (<) W g HC historical cost valuation would delay (accelerate) investment compared to fair value accounting.
Corollary 1 The e¤ects of varying the taxable fraction of …nancial assets are ambiguous.
Corollary 2 The e¤ects of varying the wealth tax rate ! are ambiguous.
Proof. To prove the existence of ambiguous results it is su¢ cient to show that the partial derivatives @ HC=F V 0 =@ and @ HC=F V 0 =@ ! may take either algebraic sign for at least one parameter setting. See the numerical results below.
The e¤ects of varying the taxable fraction of …nancial assets and the wealth tax rate ! depend on the tax and non-tax parameters r, , , r , , ! , and . Although the partial derivatives @ HC=F V 0 =@ and @ HC=F V 0 =@ ! are too complicated to be studied analytically, numerical examples show that either algebraic sign is possible. In line with prior reasoning on the wealth tax e¤ects on investment decisions under certainty (Wagner and Dirrigl 1980 , Siegel 1982 , Mellwig 1985 and Georgi 1994 we …nd puzzling and probably unintended e¤ects of wealth taxation under uncertainty. In the following, we elaborate on which e¤ect prevails under speci…c conditions. We de…ne the e¤ects of wealth taxation as "normal" if increasing wealth taxation of the investment project increases the critical investment threshold and thus delays investment and if increasing wealth taxation of …nancial assets (default alternative) reduces the critical investment threshold,
=@ > 0, we call the emerging tax e¤ects "paradoxical". 31 Further computations of the partial derivatives @ HC 0 =@ ! and @ HC 0 =@ in the limiting cases ! 0 (certainty), ! 1, r ! 1 are included in the appendix.
With respect to , the occurrence of normal or paradoxical wealth tax e¤ects essentially depends on the level of the after-tax discount rate. For su¢ ciently high after-tax discount rates r , normal tax e¤ects prevail. Hence, for high pre-tax interest rates, real-world levels of income tax rates and r , and low or moderate levels of the wealth tax rate ! , the partial derivatives @ HC 0 =@ and @ F V 0 =@ are negative, which means that increasing the taxable fraction of …nancial assets reduces the critical investment threshold and hence accelerates real investment. This e¤ect is plausible, because increasing does not a¤ect cash ‡ows from investment and only reduces the after-tax discount rate r . Hence, the real investment bene…ts in relative terms from the higher wealth taxation of the default alternative. Therefore, the present value of the investment project increases while the corresponding increase of the present value of wealth tax payments is not equally substantial. Moreover, a lower discount rate typically reduces option values (for example, Merton 1973) , which makes immediate investment more attractive. An increased project value and a reduced option value both contribute to accelerated investment.
However, with after-tax discount rates su¢ ciently close to zero, increasing increases the critical investment threshold so that a paradoxical wealth tax e¤ect occurs. 32 In these cases, increasing reduces the discount rate such that the present value of wealth taxes increases relatively more than the present value of cash ‡ows. This paradoxical e¤ect can be shown under historical cost valuation as well as under fair value accounting. The wealth tax paradox occurs for low pre-tax interest rates and a high level of the wealth tax rate. Hence, as investors currently face very low interest rates in the capital market, paradoxical e¤ects are likely to occur. These e¤ects tend to be even more distinctive for high cash ‡ow uncertainty. The identi…ed e¤ects are highly relevant and should be considered by investors and politicians.
Similar to the decision under certainty, depreciation of the project for wealth tax purposes is a crucial determinant of paradoxical tax e¤ects. If the investment project is depreciated su¢ ciently quickly, increased wealth taxation is likely to accelerate investment. In addition to the decision under certainty, the value of the option to invest has to be considered.
If the option is disregarded for tax purposes and hence not subject to wealth taxation (despite its positive economic value), it has a relative bene…t compared to the pre-tax case. The resulting relative increase of the option value tends to delay investment, hereby mitigating paradoxical wealth tax e¤ects.
To illustrate scenarios that lead to normal and paradoxical wealth tax e¤ects we use numerical examples with the parameters r = 0:04, = 0, = 0:3, = r = 0:25, = 0:3 (Figure 1 ). 33 32 See Gries et al. (2012) , who identify general conditions for neutral, normal, and paradoxical tax regimes if the di¤erential between the drift parameter of the stochastic cash ‡ow and the after-tax interest rate is su¢ ciently small. 33 The after-tax discount rate r is always strictly positive in the examples considered here.
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For ! = 0 the wealth tax value of the investment project is constant over time. Examples for a time-invariant tax value are investments in land or corporate stock. 34 Figure 1 displays the critical investment threshold under historical cost accounting as a function of the parameter . Currently, wealth tax rates range from 0.5% to 2.5% (see Table 1 ). We observe normal e¤ects with respect to for ! = 0:01 (dashed line, slightly decreasing), and paradoxical e¤ects for ! = 0:02 (dotted line, increasing). As a reference case, the solid line indicates the critical threshold without wealth taxation ( ! = 0). For fair value accounting, the e¤ects are similar and therefore not displayed here. For typical wealth tax rates (here: ! = 0:01) the impact of wealth taxation on the aftertax discount rate is rather small. Consequently, variations of the fraction of …nancial assets that is subject to wealth taxation do not a¤ect the present value of cash ‡ows and wealth tax payments as much as under higher wealth tax rates (here: ! = 0:02). In the latter case, lower after-tax discount rates due to higher values of increase the present value of wealth tax payments relatively more than the present value of cash ‡ows. For 34 Studies that identify apparently paradoxical pro…t tax e¤ects on the timing of risky investments in non-depreciable assets like land or corporate stock are, e.g., Schneider and Sureth (2010) and Gries et al. (2012) . 24 lower pre-tax interest rates (r < 0:04) paradoxical reactions are even more likely to occur.
For example, if r = 0:02 already a wealth tax rate of 0:6% induces paradoxical timing e¤ects.
Besides , we have identi…ed the wealth tax rate ! to be an important driver of ambiguous outcomes. Only if the default alternative is wealth tax-exempt or if the investor uses an exogenous time preference rate for discounting, increasing the wealth tax rate induces unambiguous e¤ects.
Proposition 5 For a wealth tax-exempt default alternative ( = 0) or if an individual time preference rate is used for discounting increasing the wealth tax rate always induces normal e¤ects.
To illustrate the forces at work Figure 2 displays the critical investment threshold as a function of the wealth tax rate ! for = 1 (solid line) and = 0 (dashed line). For ! = 0 (constant tax value of the project) we observe normal wealth tax e¤ects. Hence, the critical investment threshold increases with increasing wealth tax rate. This result also holds in the limiting case of certainty ( 2 = 0). 35 35 The assumption = 0 in our numerical example implies that in expected value terms the cash ‡ows are constant over time. Figure 2 thus illustrates the special case of an approximization of an economic depreciation for ! = 0: Furthermore, also appreciations in the option value at any point in time would have to be recognized by economic depreciation as outlined in Niemann (1999b) . 
Neutral tax systems
Having identi…ed settings that lead to both normal and paradoxical reactions, it is important to …gure out under what conditions such distortions can be avoided. By de…nition, neutral tax systems do not alter economic decisions compared to a given reference solution. In our setting a neutral tax system should leave the critical investment threshold unchanged. Since our focus is wealth taxation, but our model also includes income taxes, the necessary …rst step is to de…ne an appropriate reference case. In a strict sense, the tax system is neutral if the pre-tax investment threshold is identical to the after-tax threshold, taking both wealth and income taxation into account.
We derived the pre-tax investment threshold 0 = ( = ( 1)) (r ) in eq. (32). For deriving neutral tax systems it is necessary and su¢ cient to equate the pre-tax and the after-tax investment thresholds and to solve for the tax parameters under consideration.
As there are various tax parameters with potentially o¤setting e¤ects an in…nite number of neutral tax systems may exist. Due to di¤erent investment thresholds for historical cost and fair value accounting, neutrality conditions have to distinguish between these valuation methods.
For historical cost valuation we can derive the neutrality condition by equating the critical investment thresholds from (29) and (32) and further transformation:
This condition means that the present value of wealth taxes less the present value of tax shields due to depreciation deductions for income tax purposes must equal the constant on the right hand side. For a given depreciation rate for income tax purposes , the neutrality condition (41) translates to a neutral depreciation rate for wealth tax purposes:
This neutral depreciation rate is a function of the after-tax discount rate r and the wealth tax rate ! . Figure 6 
and thus 36 Since tax systems in the real world do not recognize mere business opportunities as taxable assets, the neutral treatment of the option to invest is not considered here. See Niemann (1999b) for neutral income taxation of an option to invest.
As a consequence, in neutral tax systems with depreciation deductions limited to acquisition costs (D 1) tax-exemption of the default alternative prohibits positive wealth taxation of real investment.
If the default alternative is not tax-exempt ( r > 0; > 0) it is always possible to …nd combinations of D ! and D that ful…ll the neutrality condition. However, it cannot be guaranteed that these algebraic solutions are feasible within the range of real-world tax systems (0 D 1). Therefore, the analytically determined neutral tax system might be only theoretically relevant and de facto impossible to be implemented in the real world.
For fair value accounting the neutrality condition can be solved with respect to the present value of depreciation deductions for income tax purposes.
Again, for a tax-exempt default alternative (r = r or r = ) a neutral depreciation schedule is not feasible within the range of traditional tax systems, because the present value of depreciation deductions exceeds the acquisition costs:
More general neutrality conditions could be derived if the option to invest would be regarded as an asset for wealth tax purposes. In this case the Johansson-Samuelson theorem would apply. 37 37 See Samuelson (1964) , Johansson (1969) .
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We analyze the impact of wealth taxation on investment timing decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility. From the variety of wealth tax parameters only a few induce unambiguous results. As could be expected, higher initial values of a project for tax purposes delay investment. This result holds for historical cost valuation as well as for fair value accounting. Which one of these valuation methods tends to accelerated (or less delayed) investment is ambiguous and depends upon the initial value. Moreover, higher depreciation rates for wealth tax purposes corresponding to a lower subsequent valuation also accelerate investment. In this respect we identify normal e¤ects only.
By contrast, the wealth tax rate as well as the wealth tax treatment of the default alternative can induce either normal or apparently paradoxical investment timing e¤ects.
For a su¢ ciently low valuation of a project due to a low initial tax value or high depreciation rates for wealth tax purposes, higher wealth tax rates can accelerate investment.
Otherwise, the normal e¤ect occurs and higher wealth tax rates delay investment. Higher wealth taxation of the default alternative can delay investment if the wealth tax rate is su¢ ciently high so that the present value of wealth tax payments increases more than the project value. Otherwise, the resulting normal tax e¤ect means that higher taxation of the default alternative favors accelerated investment. We …nd that apparently paradoxical wealth tax e¤ects (delay upon a wealth tax rate decrease) are more likely for low interest rates and for high-risk investments. Furthermore, we derive conditions for an investment neutral wealth tax that avoids such distortions. Whether and how often a normal or a paradoxical tax e¤ect prevails is an empirical question and depends on the above-mentioned wealth tax parameters as well as the pre-tax interest rate and the expected cash ‡ows of the investment project.
These results indicate that the tax legislator should be aware of the opposing e¤ects of wealth taxation on di¤erent types of projects prior to tax reforms. Estimations of revenues, as well as the redistributional potential of a wealth tax can only be meaningful if the investment e¤ects are anticipated correctly. It is doubtful whether the tax legislator's objectives can be reached by wealth-related taxes. We show that tax neutrality requires project-speci…c depreciation rules that are di¢ cult to implement from the perspective of legal certainty. It is therefore highly likely that wealth taxation has real economic e¤ects.
If the tax legislator intends to favor the realization of particular projects, it will depend on the economic parameters whether this aim or its opposite will be reached. If the tax legislator tries to prevent taxpayers from certain economic activities, for example, car usage, our examples show that wealth taxes are neither an accurate tax policy device to do so, nor will they necessarily imply an increase in revenues.
Of course, our analysis is subject to several limitations. Whereas the current tax policy discussion is centered on distributive considerations, our model does not permit conclusions regarding the distribution of wealth after the introduction of a wealth tax. Due to our assumption of equity …nancing, …nancial constraints and liquidity considerations are disregarded in the model. The revenue consequences of a wealth tax cannot be inferred from our results. This is because we take an individual rather than a macro perspective and focus on purely domestic investment. Investigating aggregate e¤ects of wealth taxation would require extensive assumptions beyond the scope of our model, such as a social discount rate or the usage of tax revenues, even if all investors were homogenous.
Therefore, we delegate aggregate as well as distributive e¤ects to future research.
Moreover, compliance costs, which are often assumed substantial for wealth taxes are disregarded here. Our model is able to predict the investment timing e¤ects of one type of wealth-related taxation, but not the combined e¤ects of either di¤erent capital taxes levied simultaneously or of di¤erential tax rates for di¤erent types of assets. For reasons of mathematical simplicity our model is limited to a perpetual option to invest.
Presuming a …nite option lifetime and hence reduced option value we would expect less distinctive results. Furthermore, we assume a full and complete loss o¤set. Relaxing this assumption is likely to generate tax-induced delays more often. 38 Whereas income taxes can be regarded as variable costs, wealth taxes are …xed costs. It is therefore likely that income taxation shifts more risk from the investor to the …scal authorities than wealth taxes. However, our model does not permit a formal proof of this conjecture. In contrast to our setting with risk neutral investors, investors are often considered risk averse. In principle, contingent claims analysis would allow us to abstract from risk aversion and use risk neutral valuation in real option approaches. Unfortunately, this approach requires the spanning property and a sophisticated Tax-CAPM that addresses the di¤erent risk pro…les and taxation of the underlying and the options adequately. For our setting the integration of risk aversion still comprises a bunch of unsolved theoretical caveats. 39
In the light of the ongoing discussion on the introduction or increase of wealth-related taxes in several countries despite the well-known ine¢ ciencies of these taxes, it is evident that the impact of wealth taxation on investments in risky projects is uncertain. Accounting for normal and paradoxical outcomes at the same time might impact economic growth negatively. Additional uncertainty arises not only because of frequent tax reforms but because of the risks involved in the valuation procedures and strictly project-dependent investment e¤ects of a wealth tax. This might wind down investors'propensity to carry out risky projects. Empirical tests are needed to learn more about the likelihood of normal and paradoxical outcomes and the magnitude of the identi…ed tax e¤ects. In further research our model should be extended with respect to stochastic wealth taxes.
For example, wealth tax payments -and not only cash ‡ows -should be considered as a stochastic process as valuation in practice often turns out to be a de facto random endeavor.
38 See Mehrmann, Schneider, and Sureth (2012) who study timing decisions under asymmetric taxation of gains and losses and identify conditions for higher taxes to increase investors' propensity to invest early. For the e¤ects of asymmetric taxation in a real options model with an imputation tax system see Panteghini (2005) . 39 See Niemann and Sureth (2004) who investigate neutral pro…t taxation under risk aversion.
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Considering the impact of wealth taxation of the default alternative, we have a very similar partial derivative @ HC 0 @ = @f @ g h + f @g @ h + f g @h @ ; 
Proposition 8 In the limiting case of pre-tax interest rates approaching in…nity (r ! 1), increasing the capital-taxable fraction of the default alternative always reduces the critical investment threshold.
lim r!1
Proposition 9 In the limiting case of no uncertainty ( ! 0), the e¤ect of increasing the capital-taxable fraction of the default alternative is indeterminate.
